Hoax As a Radical Islamic Political Movement During the Covid-19 Pandemic

Ari Sulistyanto*
E-mail: ari.sulistyanto@dsn.ubharajaya.ac.id
Faculty of Communication Science, University of Bhayangkara Jakarta Raya, Jakarta.

Dwinarko
E-mail: dwinarko@dsn.ubharajaya.ac.id
Faculty of Communication Science, University of Bhayangkara Jakarta Raya, Jakarta.

Erita Riski Putri
E-mail: eritariski.putri@gmail.com
Faculty of Communication Science, University of Ibnu Chaldun Jakarta, Jakarta.

Abstract

The propagation of hoaxes may be associated with individuals or groups secretly planning certain objectives. The propagation of hoaxes during the COVID-19 pandemic became interesting as hoaxes became a significant part of the political movement. In Indonesia, radical Islamic groups have been growing and are distinct from other Islamic groups, and they want to change the administration system of the Indonesian state based on Islam or the caliphate. To achieve their political objectives, this group carries out political movements with various activities, such as propaganda, Da'wah, and mastery of education. Therefore, the aim of this study will be to uncover hoaxes as a radical Islamic political movement in mobilizing opinions and support. Framing analysis is an approach to analyzing hoax frames as a political movement, and deep interviews to uncover the resonance of hoax frames. The study findings helped identify the causes of COVID- 19, radical Islamic groups have framing political discrimination and conspiracy to propagate COVID-19. In a prognostic setting, radical Islamic groups say that applying Islamic law will help them avoid COVID-19. Meanwhile, by mobilizing collective action or motivation frames, China is depicted as a murderer and an attempt to marginalize Islam. A further conclusion is that hoax frames are capable of resonating with the public, such as the cause of COVID-19 is a conspiracy, the implementation of Islamic law has a way to prevent COVID-19, and China with a vaccine that seeks to dominate Indonesia. The implication of this research is to contribute knowledge about radical Islamic political movements in the digital era by using hoaxes as a means of mobilizing opinions and collective action.

Key words: Framing, Politics movements, Hoax, Radical Islam

Introduction

Radical Islamic groups are movement groups which aim to make Indonesia a country with an Islamic order. This group considers obedience to the teachings of Islam not to the state. This group of political Muslims does not trust official Muslim organizations, whether they are socio-religious or political. Because they see the major Islamic organizations as overly accommodating and compromising on political and religious realities in Indonesia (Muthohirin, 2017; Azra, 2012). As a result, his followers sometimes carry out actions that, by normal standards, are very rude, for instance, destroying anything that is deemed not to comply with the norms and the teachings of Islam, like visiting and damaging entertainment venues because it is regarded as a place of immorality (Adfalal et al., 2005; Thoyyib, 2018). This political Islam group consistently wants to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state, by establishing a caliphate system (Halim, A & Kesuma, 2019). Therefore, upholding Islamic law must be fought through various ways such as carrying out Da'wah, propaganda for the ideology of the caliphate and various other forms of movement.

The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 in Indonesia also propagated information that was described as a social media hoax. According to the records of the Ministry of Information, there were around 785 hoaxes news found on Facebook, 10 news on Instagram, 6 cases on YouTube and lastly as much as 324 cases on Twitter (Aziz, 2020). These hoax issues were encountered in various cases. For example, hoaxes about the economic crisis scenario in Indonesia, information about medicines to prevent coronavirus, about how to prevent coronavirus, how to transmit the coronavirus, about several heads of state who have repented due to this virus, even up to free internet plans (Sulistyanto & Jamil, 2021).

In the digital era, hoaxes have become part of the political game by manipulating information to attack individuals or institutions. The proliferation of hoaxes in the political game of the digital era in Indonesia is due to the original character of the Indonesian people, who are not used to a healthy democracy (Yusuf, 2019). The Indonesian people are not accustomed to recording and storing data as habits support their other characteristics, so they often speak without data (Miftah, 2019). On the other hand, the Indonesian people prefer to discuss aspects related to violence, sensuality, drama, intrigue, and mysteries that often color political activity, so hoaxes often occur in political themes (Mulyana, 2017). As a result, it resulted in riots. For example, the riots surrounding the Papuan student dormitory were caused by a hoax containing the dumping of red and white flags in a sewer (Mardiansyah, 2020). Demonstrations that ended in riots regarding the Job Creation Law (Omnibus Law) (Ali, 2020). The incident occurred because they trusted hoax information circulating on social media more than official information, which was rich in data.

Hoaxes as a political game are important for radical Islamic groups in Indonesia in mobilizing opinions and collective action. For example, hoaxes as an effective means of carrying out political movements. The Islamic-Buzzer, former Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in Bandung City in West Java, made the spread of hoaxes part of the propaganda of the Caliphate Islamiyah (Islamic State) ideology (Setyaji, 2018). The Saracen organized group and the Muslim Cyber Army carried out the spread of hoaxes, incitement to hatred, and slander claims to be defenders of Islam to attract the empathy of thousands of people to affiliate with the group (Anshori, 2019). The hoax content they spread was about the issue of the revival of the PKI, the persecution of scholars, and the attacks on certain figures. This radical Islamic group also defends the Muslim community and considers other groups as their enemies (Setyaji, 2018). Sydney Jones's analysis of the phenomenon of Islamic radical groups in Indonesia, their number is a minority, and fewer of them use violence (Sahri, 2016). Islamic religious radicalism can be said a religious behavior that wants drastic changes by taking a hard character that aims to realize certain goals that do not want to submit to a legitimate government (Ummah, 2012).

The Covid pandemic is a health crisis that has hit the whole world (Pollard et al., 2020). In a crisis, it becomes a gap for radical Islamic groups to carry out political movements by spreading hoaxes. Radical Islamic political movements continue to develop to establish an Islamic state with a caliphate system. Therefore, various political movement strategies are used to achieve these goals. Greg & Bubalo (2007) note states radical Islamic political movements are divided into three main channels for spreading social movements, Islamic educational institutions, and the publication of ideas through

electronic and print media (Greg & Bubalo, 2007). The digital era of this group's political movement expands and adapts to the times by utilizing digital technology such as social media and online media as a means of spreading the ideology of the caliphate.

Social media has become a new propaganda medium for mobilizing opinions. In a previous study, through the WhatsApp application, the Tarbiyah movement carried out a semi-virtual Al Quran movement with the label One Day One Juz (ODOJ) successfully mobilizing 1400 followers from inside and outside Indonesia (Nisa, 2018). Key ODOJ actors are activists from the Tarbiyah movement, which is part of the Indonesian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Abdullah et al., 2019). Research on Felix Siauw, a Chinese Muslim preacher affiliated with the transnational Islamic movement, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), uses social media as a medium of Da'wah aimed at middle-class Indonesian youth with low theological education. Preachers work with visual images and memes as well as with simple textual messages that appeal to an urban middle-class audience just discovering their religiosity (Slama, 2018; Hew, 2018).

Other studies have reported the ideological relationship of Islamic online media with religious issues. This study is part of a radical Islamic political movement through the Islamic online media. The results of the study reveal that the issue of jihad is framed differently by online Islamic media, such as jihad which is interpreted as a war to uphold God's law, as a real war, and as the liberation of Muslim lands related to the conflict in Rohingya and Palestine (Suprabowo, 2020). A study on hate terror under the guise of religion by the Muslim Cyber Army (MCA) in Online Media. This study reveals that the Muslim Cyber Army group defends the Muslim community and considers other groups as their enemies (Setyaji, 2018).

So far, studies on the mobilization of opinions through disinformation or hoaxes are still rarely carried out. This study seeks to reveal the other side of radical Islamic political movements through the spread of hoaxes on social media during the Covid-19 pandemic. Therefore, this study will highlight the potential of hoaxes as an important part of the political movement of radical Islamic groups. During the Covid-19 pandemic, it became interesting when movement actors through hoaxes built religious sentiments to expand the influence of radical Islamic ideology.

Analysis to understand political movements, Benford & Snow (2012) offer a framing perspective in explaining the role of actors in the movement to frame reality to mobilize and garner support and neutralize opposition (Benford, 2012). Actors' movements are seen as signifying agents who are actively involved in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents and political sympathizers and opponents (Snow, 2013; Benford, 2012; Snow & Benford, 1988). Framing theory explains framing involves selection and salience. Framing is selecting some aspect of reality that is felt to be more prominent in a text being communicated in such a way as to promote the definition of a particular problem, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment (Entman, 2010). The core framing tasks referred to as "diagnostic framing" focused on problem definition (problem identification and attribution), "prognostic framing," offering desired solutions, and "motivational framing (Benford, 2000). The creation of a shared picture of problems and solutions leads to "consensus mobilization" within a diagnostic and prognostic framing. While motivational framing aims at "action mobilization", encouraging collective action based on shared perceptions (Lindekilde, 2014).

In the study of social movements, they said frame theories are effective if they can resonate by mobilizing movement participants or actors involved (Andersen & Sandberg, 2020). Previous studies have focused more on frame-forming actors, such as the mass media or activists. Some view frames as frames that are formed interactively and dialogically. Research on immigrant social movements in the United States draws on survey experiments—to examine how much human rights, economics, and family framing contests shape Californian views of legalization and immigrants (Bloemraad et al., 2016). Other research uses survey methods, such as research applied to the agenda-setting approach (Wang, 2018; Tsur, 2015). Therefore, to see the resonance frame for the Covid-19 hoax by conducting interviews with activists of radical Islamic groups.

Therefore, this study aims to reveal hoaxes as a political movement of radical Islamic groups during the Covid-19 pandemic. To see the success of hoax frames as a political movement that is able to

interact with other activists or groups of sympathizers, this study also reveals the resonance that arises due to hoax frames. This research contributes to knowledge about radical Islamic political movements from another perspective, namely through the spread of hoaxes.

Methods

Research Design

This study uses a qualitative method with the framing approach of Benford & Snow (2012) to uncover hoaxes as a political movement. From a framing perspective, movement actors frame reality to mobilize and garner support as well as neutralize opposition (Snow et al., 2018). Hoax as a political movement, how Islamic radical groups define the problem or cause of the Covid pandemic and offer solutions to these problems and encourage the potential public to join political movements during the covid pandemic. Likewise, hoax frames displayed during the Covid pandemic are expected to be well perceived by sympathizers. The existence of a positive response to the hoax frame shows the resonance of the frame.

Data Collection and Analysis

The hoaxes data collected from the Ministry of Communication and Information (Kominfo) website, which routinely classifies and disseminates various information from online media and social media which are categorized as hoaxes or disinformation. January 1, 2020 will be the start of the collection of hoax data. The selection of the time period starts from the period from the spread of the COVID-19 virus to the recovery phase by conducting a mass vaccination program by the Indonesian government. The selection criteria are if the hoax contains the word "Islam". Based on the search results, it has collected from as many as 135 hoax posts circulating on social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, as well as Instagram.

Interviews were conducted with activists belonging to radical Islamic groups, such as former activists of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The interview guide is based on an analysis of the salient frame of the hoax to find out the resonance.

Grounded theory is used as a data analysis technique that is carried out in three stages (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The details of the three stages are open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. In open coding, check each text on each blog by reading line by line to gain an understanding of the memorable experience of cultural tourism. Axial coding is to do the integration by means of categorization of the results of open coding. Selective coding makes connections between categories, which then form a theme or concept. To facilitate coding and data analysis using the N-Vivo 12 plus software tools. Data analysis was carried out to determine the hoax frame by coding by examining the text with the technique of reading data frequently from hoax posts analytically, to produce patterns or themes in the data (Braun, 2013).

An illustration of the coding process can be seen in Table 1, for example, in the diagnostic frame, which aims to determine the cause of the problem. Frames regarding Foreign Workers and Chinese Citizens as cause disperses Covid-19. The frame was formed from numerous hoax posts framing calls to avoid being in close contact with Chinese citizens, Chinese tourists who died from Covid, and foreign workers as Covid-19 carriers.

Table 1. *Coding of Radical Islamic Group Hoax*

Frame	Theme	Axial Coding	Open Coding	Data Sources

Diagnostic	▪ Policy Discrimination	▪ Priviledge Rights	▪ Chinese Foreign Workers	☐ Circulating on social media a video recording the arrival of foreign workers from China at Haluoleo Kendari airport.
	▪ Conspira- tion	▪ Engineering	▪ Intentional	☐ Don't because of the corona covid-19 outbreak you are being played by the devil, you have been deceived, with the corona virus. This is one of the cruelest slanders of the Dajjal at the end of time.
Prognostic	▪ Islam as a Solution to the Covid-19 Pandemic	☐ Learning Islam	▪ Changing ideological/ religious beliefs	▪ In China, many Chinese citizens study Islam, because Muslims are free from the corona virus.
	▪ Vaccine is Haram	☐ Halal Certificate	▪ Prohibition of vaccines	▪ Acehnese clerics forbid the Covid-19 vaccine
Motivation	▪ Killer China	▪ Rules Indonesia	▪ Musnahkan Islam	☐ A mass corona test was carried out by Chinese doctors who were considered to be able to sentence patients to be positive even though the test results were negative, where the fate of life and death of important Indonesian figures such as religious leaders, TNI officials, anti-communist activists, lecturers, scientists, thinkers and others depended on China.
	▪ Marginalization of Islamic Scholars	▪ Prohibition of Friday prayers	▪ Prohibition of worship	☐ Circular letter of the Mayor of Kupang, regarding the notification of the ban on Friday prayers and congregational prayers.

Source: by the author

Results

Diagnostic Frame: Policy Discrimination and Conspiracy

In framing ideas, the diagnostic framework wants to identify problems and attributions. (Bloemraad, et al, 2016). Diagnostic framing usually involves the construction of a frame of injustice, which is based on an interpretation of what happened that supports the conclusion that the system of authority violates the participants' shared moral principles (Hänggli, 2010). As a result, it finds out what is wrong and what needs improvement. In the diagnostic frame, Islamic radical groups see the source of the problem and the resulting injustice, namely the existence of policy discrimination by the Indonesian government and the practice of conspiracies.

Since the first time, the Covid virus attacked Wuhan, China, and during that period, the virus had spread outside the Wuhan area. The Indonesian government has not taken the spread seriously. However, hoaxes about Covid-19 have been widely circulated on social media. The diagnostic frame identifies Chinese citizens and foreign workers (TKA) as the source of the problem causing Covid-19. Radical Islamic groups see discrimination by the government related to the distribution of workers. Indonesia, with an abundant workforce and many unemployed, however, has brought in many Chinese workers to work in Indonesia. Therefore, "Chinese citizens and foreign workers" reflect their vigilance towards them and make it a source of problems for the spread of Covid-19. It formed this diagnostic frame based on a hoax that informed Chinese citizens and foreign workers who died in Indonesia due to contracting Covid-19. In the circulating hoax quotes on Facebook, narrate,

"The coronavirus has infected a Chinese citizen who lives in the Taman Anggrek Apartment, West Jakarta." Or "Chinese Tourists from Bali Positively Affected by Corona Virus."

The hoax narrative provides important insight into the stigmatization of Chinese citizens living or working in Indonesia. The stigmatization of China has indeed gone global, the results explain that many stigmatize China as "Wuhan pneumonia", "Wuhan Coronavirus", "China Pneumonia" "Chinese coronavirus" (Hu et al., 2020). In the pre-crisis diagnostic frame, Chinese foreigners are considered guilty agents because they are carriers of the Covid-19 virus, so they should be shunned.

When President Joko Widodo announced the formation of the Covid-19 Task Force (Kompas, 2020). This policy is a response to the findings of 2 confirmed cases of Covid-19, as well as criticism from several groups who say that the Indonesian government is slow in handling Covid- 19 (News, 2020). Since the announcement of the first case, Indonesia has taken various policy steps to address it. One of them is PSBB (Large-Scale Social Restrictions) and PPKM (Enforcement of Community Activity Restrictions). As a result, various activities were limited, and public facilities, including mosques and other places of worship, were closed to avoid crowds.

The existence of this social restriction policy, in a diagnostic frame that stands out, is the issue of the arrival of Chinese foreign workers. This phenomenon has become a controversy amid the restrictions on foreigners entering Indonesia. They have levelled various criticisms against the government's policy of allowing Chinese foreign workers to arrive. Critics from the House of Representatives regretted the government's plan to permit the arrival of 500 Chinese foreign workers or Chinese foreign workers to Southeast Sulawesi. Granting permits to foreign nationals to work in the country is a form of government insensitivity to its own people. The reason is that currently, Indonesia itself is in the middle of handling the Coronavirus or Covid-19 outbreak (Cahyani, 2020). Likewise, criticism from public figures, assessed that the arrival of the Chinese foreign workers' group indicated that the Indonesian government was more concerned with economic issues than saving the mental health of its people (Nashear, 2021). The hoax posts spread about the arrival of Chinese foreign workers entering the village of Kawasi, South Halmahera, Maluku by private boat. Posts in the form of videos uploaded on social media YouTube regarding the arrival of Chinese foreign workers at Soekarno Hatta Airport, followed by the narration,

"The fact that dozens of Chinese foreign workers at Terminal 2 Airport entered Indonesia is terrible. What's wrong with the Indonesian people in lockdown."

The hoax narrative wants to convey the message that it is necessary to be vigilant about the arrival of Chinese foreign workers. Because in another hoax post, described as Chinese foreign workers is a disguise from the Chinese Army who wants to control Indonesia, more specifically attacking Muslims. The Chinese state, with a communist ideological system for radical Islamic groups, is the enemy. Communists are considered not to believe in God and say that God is a myth and delusion and that religion is the opium of the people (Almanhaj, 2020).

When Covid-19 turned into a health crisis, several theories regarding the origin of this virus began circulating on the internet. All of them have the same information that the government regime deliberately created this virus in a laboratory. Even though scientists from various countries have researched Covid-19, which concluded that this virus came from animals, conspiracy theories still gain traction to be followed on the internet (Mian & Khan, 2020). Various conspiracy issues, such as the origin of Covid-19 caused by electromagnetic waves transmitted by 5G telephone poles, and intentional control over the human population (Depoux et al., 2020; Kouzy et al., 2020). As a result, misinformation and fake news circulating on the internet can change people's behaviour to take greater risks. (Brainard & Hunter, 2020). Fake news spreads faster and more easily, as dangerously, as the spread of the virus itself. Misinformation causes confusion and spreads fear, thus hampering the response to the outbreak. (Depoux et al., 2020).

For radical Islamic groups, many people's beliefs and fears that Covid-19 is part of a conspiracy are used to frame hoaxes. Covid-19 is part of a conspiracy to restrict Muslims from worshipping. In a hoax frame, criticizing the congregational prayer policy by implementing social distancing, and calling the government policy the devil. Written hoax narration

"Don't because of the corona covid-19 outbreak, you are being played by the devil, you have been deceived by the presence of the coronavirus. This is one of the cruellest slanders of the dajjal at the end of time."

Islamic religious leaders who are always at odds with the government and affiliated with radical Islamic groups say the existence of Covid is a conspiracy. The opinion of Covid-19 as a coherent conspiracy with the Indonesian government is considered slow in responding and taking preventive action. Government authorities also tend to underestimate and even ignore the threat of the coronavirus that is already in sight.

Prognosis Frame: Islam as a Solution to Overcoming the Covid Pandemic and Haram Vaccines

The prognostic frames describe how the problems identified in the diagnostic framework should be solved. While prognostic frameworks are intended to offer desired solutions, they rarely offer concrete plans (Lindekilde, 2014). Rather, such a frame provides a utopian vision for society in the future. Several cases studies have revealed that the prognostic dimension is one of the main ways to characterize a social or political movement that can be different from other political movements (Benford, 2000).

In this frame, placing the Shari'a or procedures in Islam becomes a source to overcome the Covid-19 outbreak, and places many Chinese citizens who follow Islamic Shari'a to avoid Covid-19. The frame built by radical Islamic groups by implementing Islamic law is a solution to avoid Covid-19. For example, by performing ablution, you can avoid Covid-19. From an ideological point of view, radical Islamic groups are well-known for their textual understanding of the scriptures. This group emphasizes the understanding of the prophet's hadith regardless of the historical process that gave birth to it. This group is more concerned with the meaning of the birth of the text. In this case, the emphasis of the hadith texts focuses only on the language aspect. The attitude of this group seeks to purify the teachings of Islam, and reject rituals that are considered heretical such as tahlil, prayer, istighasah, pilgrimage of guardians and so on, then spread to efforts to enforce Islamic law and the doctrine of Jihad (Nadia, 2018). Therefore, the hoax frame focuses more on Islamic attributes that are sourced from the holy book.

To ensure that carrying out Islamic law can avoid Covid-19, the prognosis frame is compared with the situation in China. In a hoax frame, radical Islamic groups place China as an object that follows Islamic procedures. Various hoax claims depicting China as a communist country that does not know God have turned to the belief system taught by Islam. For example, hoax claims, such as, "Afraid of

Corona, Chinese Citizens Scramble for the Qur'an to be Learned", "Mosques in China Re-opened After China Was Hit by the Corona Virus", "Chinese Non-Muslims Join Prayers because of this fear of contracting the Coronavirus ", "Chinese people are busy saying the creed to avoid the Coronavirus". The hoax frame seeks to convince China, which is known as a communist country, that many people practice Islamic rituals to avoid Covid.

In dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indonesian government has issued various policies. One of them is the vaccination program, but not all parties support this policy. There are several parties who have expressed criticism that the vaccination program has caused various controversies, ranging from halal-haram vaccines, untested vaccines, and vaccine business to fake vaccines (Sulistyanto & Jamil, 2021).

In the procurement of vaccinations, the Indonesian government has announced that it has collaborated with Sinovac to procure vaccines. It was criticized by the political opposition that Sinovac's vaccine was untested and ineffective. In fact, Fadli Zon, a member of the House of Representatives (DPR) referred to it as the "China vaccine" or the "hammer and sickle vaccine". The mention was a vaccine from the communist state. On this criticism, the government stated that the use of the Sinovac vaccine was after obtaining an emergency permit from the Food and Drug Supervisory Agency (BPOM) based on the results of clinical trials. On the other hand, there have been criticisms of not depending on Sinovac vaccines and prioritizing the use of domestically produced vaccines from PT. Bio Farma, because it is one of the best vaccine manufacturers in the world.

In the prognostic framework, hoaxes followed the flow of the controversy, resulting in various hoaxes, such as vaccine prices, illegal vaccines, and deaths from vaccines. In a hoax regarding vaccine prices, news circulated on social media that the price of Sinovac vaccines in Indonesia was 1000% more expensive than in Brazil. The hoax began with a link to an article by one of the Facebook accounts entitled "The price of China's Sinovac Vaccine in Brazil is only IDR 28,000, why Indonesia 300,000?" A narration that claims the price of Sinovac's vaccine in Indonesia accompanied the upload of the link is 1000% more expensive than in Brazil.

In Indonesia, which is predominantly Muslim, the issue of haram and halal is important. Haram because the manufacturing process uses pork enzymes. In Islamic teachings, pork is prohibited for consumption and Islamic radical groups taking advantage of the issue, that halal certificates are not

issued by the Indonesian Clerics Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or called MUI). In a hoax circulating on social media, PT Surveyor Indonesia has given the authority to issue halal product certification, and no longer in the hands of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). The hoax frame is intended to marginalize the role of MUI as an institution that has the authority to issue halal certificates.

Motivational Frame: Killer China and the Marginalization of Scholars

The heart of social movements is the collective action framework (CAF) (Daellenbach, 2017). The public has a frame of reference for seeing the world and interpreting it. The social movement frame serves to shape public orientation and belief. While diagnostic and prognostic frameworks play an important role in mobilizing support, they are not sufficient to encourage people to act. Indeed, Bert Klandermans argues that identification of problems and offering solutions achieves consensus mobilization, i.e., mobilization of support for Social Movement Organization (SMO) objectives (Klandermans, 1988). But consensus mobilization does not automatically lead to action mobilization. Motivational framing aims to encourage participation and generate the necessary incentives for action. Thus, potential proponents of collective action should anticipate that their involvement and association with SMO will help resolve the issue. When motivational frameworks are shared widely, the opportunities for collective action increase substantially. Regarding the motivational frame, Islamic radical groups frame the Sinovac vaccine as a killer vaccine and an attempt to marginalize Islam.

When the government announced the Covid-19 vaccination program and appointed Sinovac as the vaccine provider. Various parties doubted the quality of the vaccine and suggested using other vaccines because Sinovac's vaccines have not been tested for quality. Fadli Zon, a member of the Indonesian Parliament, called on the Indonesian government not to depend on the Sinovac vaccine because its efficacy and safety are not yet clear (Gunadha & Bhayangkara, 2021). Rejection of the Sinovac vaccine also came from other countries for the same reason, Sinovac's vaccine was considered to have low quality.

To achieve collective action, radical Islamic groups deliberately frame the Sinovac vaccine as a killer vaccine. Circulating video uploads on Twitter social media regarding statements by communist party officials in China criticizing the inappropriate quality of vaccines from China. hoax quotes,

"Haha, the Chinese Communist Party admits to the public that the quality of vaccines made in China is not up to standard. I think they themselves are afraid to use this vaccine, for fear of killing people and losing face."

China was framed as a killer, because posts circulated on social media containing a narrative that Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment (Menko Marves) Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan picked up the Covid-19 vaccine to China with the intention of destroying the natives. In fact, Luhut and other parties went to China to ensure the safety of the vaccine. Luhut is planned to go to China with several parties in mid-October 2020. They consist of Luhut, Minister of Health, Terawan Agus Putranto, President Director of PT Bio Farma, Honesti Basyir, and a number of representatives from the Indonesian Clerics Council (MUI). Luhut and his team's visit was to ensure vaccine safety.

The issue of Sinovac vaccine as a killer vaccine has an impact on people's fear and anxiety to vaccinate. For example, people with disabilities in Yogyakarta refused the vaccine because they believed that disinformation was a hoax about the post-vaccine medical effects. The spread of

vaccine disinformation in the form of hoaxes continued, and even grew rapidly, during the Covid-19 pandemic (Fisher et al., 2021). A number of facts state that some people refuse vaccines because after receiving the Covid-19 vaccine they will die after three years of the vaccine being given (Ravelo, 2021).

Marginalization of Muslim Clerics is an important theme of a motivational framework. Radical Islamic groups always position themselves as opposition to the government. Muslim Clerics in Indonesia are accused of being criminals because of their lectures or delivery of their teachings are considered having committed criminal acts such as hate speech or were involved in acts of terrorism. Meanwhile, Muslim Clerics have the right to express their opinions in the form of preaching in accordance with the laws and regulations has regulated in Indonesia, namely the rules governing the freedom to express opinions freely and responsibly. This legal fact has led to many arrests of Muslim Clerics as part of the criminalization of Cleric. Radical Islamic groups build narratives of every arrest of Cleric who violates the law, the arrest of the Muslim Clerics is part of the criminalization of clerics carried out by the government.

Examples of cases of arrests of clerics for violating the law, such as Habib Bahar Bin Smith, being re-arrested for violating the assimilation agreement regarding his lectures that offended the authorities. The lecture delivered by Habib Bahar Bin Smith is considered to have caused unrest among the public and Habib Bahar Bin Smith is also accused of violating the PSBB rules so that this is what caused the assimilation agreement to be revoked. His lectures were too provocative to spread hatred and insult the authorities (Saputra, 2021). Habib Rizieq Shihab's statement which says "Sukarno's Pancasila Godhead is in the ass, while the Jakarta Charter's Pancasila Godhead is in the head" (Batubara, 2021). Likewise, the arrest of a suspected terrorist, Farid Okba who is known as one of the MUI administrators (Briantika, 2021).

Previously, the Indonesian government to overcome the spread of the virus carried out tracing by conducting rapid tests. However, this policy was responded by radical Islamic groups as part of the marginalization of Muslim clerics. This is an opportunity for Islamic radical groups to frame collective actions by spreading hoaxes, such as the subtle kidnapping of a cleric by giving a positive verdict for Covid-19 or using a rapid test kit to kill a cleric. The hoax was an effort to build sentiment among Muslims that the criminalization carried out continued during the administration of President Jokowi. Hoaxes regarding the systematic killing of clerics through vaccines are an attempt to marginalize Islam and also build the sentiments of togetherness among Muslims to fight against government power.

Mahfud MD refuted the notion that there was an attempt to criminalize ulemas, Mahfud MD said that none of the clerics had been criminalized, and that the clerics were being prosecuted because they were proven to have made mistakes (Ramadhan, 2020). But on the other hand, there are those who say that there has been an attempt to criminalize clerics in Indonesia. The chairman of the National Movement to Guard the Fatwa of the Indonesian Clerics Council (GNPF-MUI), the chairman of the GNPF-MUI said that the accusations against Islamic clerics and activists are not beneficial to the coexistence of religious people especially towards Muslims (Putnra, 2021).

Resonance

Benford and Snow (2000) explain that frame resonance is needed as an indicator of the success of political movements (Bloemraad, et al. 2016). Political movements achieve success when actors are able to voice their goals meaningfully to the public outside the circle of the actor's political movement. That's when the frame can be said to "resonate" transforming thoughts, ideas, and

beliefs to a wider audience (Snow, et al. 2018). Resonance is aimed at actual or potential followers because framing generally occurs across multiple audiences, both internal and external. Framing a message in the hope of resonating with one audience risks undermining the prospect of resonating with another audience (Lindekilde, 2014).

In this study, resonance was carried out through interviews with constituents of radical Islamic groups, namely HTI and FPI activists, both active members and sympathizers. Meanwhile, the external audience analyzes online media coverage based on prominent hoax frames.

Conspiracy is an attempt to explain a big thing and condition as an evil act of a secret and powerful group (Douglas et al., 2017). In looking at the causes of the Covid-19 pandemic, constituents of Islamic radical groups believe the cause of Covid-19 is the result of a conspiracy carried out by infidel countries (thoqut) for their own interests. In his view, China is just the beginning of the conspiracy.

> *"China is just a place where the conspiracy began. But actually other infidel countries also contributed to the idea of the conspiracy."*

However, when the Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) implemented, sympathizers of radical Islamic groups saw policy discrimination. On the one hand, the government has imposed restrictions on social interaction and restrictions on the entry of foreigners to Indonesia. But on the other hand, there is freedom of entry for Chinese foreign workers to Indonesia. They also believe that the arrival of Chinese foreign workers is a Chinese army in disguise to control Indonesia.

> *"I believe that, because of the information I got from the Chinese TKA, his body is as sturdy as a soldier's physique."*

In preventing Covid-19, there is an emphasis on hoax frames regarding the prevention of Covid-19 by implementing Islamic law, even many hoaxes that explain countries previously known to be non-Muslims have participated in implementing Islamic law to avoid Covid-19. Radical Islamic activists and sympathizers believe that implementing Islamic law can prevent the Covid-19 virus.

"God willing, because with prayer we must first purify ourselves and must be free from major and minor hadats, including from najis. Likewise, reading the Qur'an."

They also argue that the Covid-19 vaccine is haram because it contains pork fat. Therefore, they generally do not want to vaccinate and prefer Islamic sharia rituals to avoid Covid-19.

Discussion

Based on the research findings, the discussion will discuss the Covid-19 hoax as an important part of the political movement. In the era of digital media, radical Islamic groups always use social media as a means of spreading ideology. The results of this study strengthen the results of previous research, through social media WhatsApp makes da'wah media to mobilize religious sentiments rooted in the Tarbiyah movement. The movement has relied on technology since its inception. This demonstrates the capacity of technology to generate and structure semi-virtual socio-religious movements (Nisa, 2018). A preacher who is a transnational Islamic wing, in his lectures, to develop strategies to normalize religious radicalism and attract a wider audience. Radical Islamic groups, known as "textual groups," seek to spread ideology in accordance with their interpretation of the truth of the Qur'an. It is called a textual group because understanding the holy book of the Koran is done rigidly according to the sound of the text in the Koran, without adjusting to the times (Thoyyib, 2018).

In the post truth era, this radical Islamic group took advantage of the health crisis situation, namely the Covid-19 pandemic, to expand political movements by using social media to spread hoaxes. The research findings explain that hoax frames regarding Covid-19 are trusted by their sympathizers or constituents with the resonance of the hoax frame. This finding is in line with the results of research on the 2016 US presidential election, fake news posted on Twitter managed to increase Donald Trump's popularity by 25%, compared to Hillary Clinton who relied more on conventional media, such as newspapers and TV (Bovet & Makse, 2019). The results of another study, regarding the proliferation of fake news on Twitter during the 2016 US presidential election cycle. Fake news accounts for almost 6% of all news consumption, then those who are exposed to fake news, and then involved in spreading it by 80%. Interestingly, fake news was most concentrated among conservative voters, Donald Trump supporters (Grinberg et al., 2019).

To achieve the goal of resonance, Benford & Snow (2000) argue that frame resonance varies in two distinct ways, "credibility" and "prominence" (Holley, 2018). Credibility describes the ability of a frame to be supported by empirical evidence that impacts material evidence that makes the frame "real" to some extent believable by constituents (Snow et al., 2018). With such a conceptual framework, radical Islamic groups frame China not only for its people who have followed Islamic law but also President of People's Republic of China, Xi Jin Ping as if depicted as powerless against the spread of Covid-19 and finally turning to Islam. The frame can be found in the following narrative, "President of People's Republic of China Announces Coronavirus Has Become an Epidemic and Asks for Prayers from Muslims". Or, "Xi Jinping asks Muslims to pray for China's country due to the coronavirus".

In Indonesia, coinciding with the election of the Governor of DKI Jakarta at the end of 2016 to April 2017, hoaxes became an effective media for political movements to attack competing candidates. Hoax content received by users contains socio-political topics (related to the election of governors, government) and 88.6% contains racial or SARA themes (Mastel, 2017). The use of racial or SARA issues was very effective against Basuki Tjahya Purnama (Ahok) and boosted Anis Baswedan as the winner.

The phenomenon of spreading hoaxes as a political movement in the post truth era has become effective because of the role of social media. The characteristics of social media that can be reproduced and disseminated repeatedly and are able to reach a broad public in seconds make a lie that is spread repeatedly, without realizing it, will be accepted as the truth. This phenomenon is in line with the classic theory of the Nazi propaganda expert Goebbels of Hitler's era, a falsehood that is spread over and over

will become the truth.

Conclusion

The conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that hoaxes as a political movement of radical Islamic groups provide new insights into mobilizing the support of sympathizers of this group. Previously, in mobilizing support, they carried out Da'wah and propaganda activities by spreading Islamic ideology in accordance with their interpretation of truth. However, in the post- truth era, hoaxes, as part of disinformation, in fact, become an important part of political movements. The existence of a resonance which is a dialogical interaction between the hoax frame and the sympathizers of Islamic radical groups evidence this. This study also concludes, when hoaxes are framed and aimed at groups that have the same ideological preferences, it will have a significant impact in mobilizing opinions and actions. Hence, future research needs to know the impact on groups with different preferences, and the wider population.

This research has important implications, firstly, hoaxes were originally understood as false information designed to attack the credibility of institutions or individuals. In this research, hoaxes have expanded their definition, meaning that hoaxes have become a medium for political movements. Secondly, provide an understanding of the nature of the radical Islamic movement in Indonesia. This group always makes movements to achieve political goals with various forms of movement in order to form collective action, so as to be able to realize the formation of a "caliphate state".

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